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Abstract
We estimate a dynamic oligopoly entry game in the early U.S. local telephone market. We observe the
identities of potential entrants into local markets and therefore the waiting time of each potential entrant
before it commits actual entry. To capture the feature of the data, we allow firms to be heterogeneous
long-run players who have option value of waiting. We find that firm-level heterogeneity in entry costs
plays a significant role in determining a firm’s entry behavior into a local market. Our model can be used
to conduct counterfactual simulations to understand the effectiveness of subsidy policies with different
focuses.
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1 Introduction
This paper seeks to understand the importance of heterogeneity in dynamic, strategic interactions in a high-
stake market. Specifically, we study the entry decisions into local telephone markets in the United States.
The passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 opened the floodgate to competitive entry into this
industry. The entrants (known as Competitive Local Exchange Carriers, or CLECs) were aided by implicit
subsidies from government and equipment suppliers, and they varied substantially in size, ownership and
financial structure, and telecommunications experience.
What would be an effective subsidy policy by the Federal Communication Commission if the goal is to
accelerate the arrival of competition in relatively rural, sparsely-populated areas? The current practice is
to offer subsidy to every entering CLEC. Would this type of subsidy achieve its goal to alleviate the divide
between urban and rural communities? Not necessarily. For example, a subsidy to reduce sunk costs of
entry in rural areas, applied to every potential entrant, will also lower the expectation of entry value of
every potential entrant because its competitors are also subsidized and thus more likely to enter. Therefore
a market may have to wait longer for competition to arrive under this subsidy policy. Ultimately, this is
an empirical question which depends on the effects of the subsidy on the entry costs and entry value. Since
entry costs can vary substantially across firms and entry value across markets, it is important for researchers
and policy markers to take into account firm- and market- level heterogeneity.
In order to answer the above question, we need to directly estimate the distributions of heterogenous sunk
costs. We employ a rich panel data which record all CLECs’ entry decisions into local telephone markets.
What is novel in our data is that we observe the identities of potential entrants into local markets and
therefore the waiting time of each potential entrant before entry. This is because one key feature of the
industry after the 1996 Act: a firm needs to obtain certification from a state in order to become a potential
entrant to cities within the state. From our data we observe a large variation in the waiting time for a CLEC
to commit actual entry after it obtains certification. The entry decisions, and more importantly, the timing
of entry allow us to infer firms’ heterogeneous sunk costs of entry.
To capture the feature of the data, we set up a dynamic entry model based on Pakes, Ostrovsky and
Berry (2007) (henceforth, POB) with two deviations. First, a firms is a long-run player and decides on
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entering or waiting. When making this decision, a firm compares the value of entry subtracted by the entry
costs with the option value of waiting. This is in contrast with most entry studies in which a firm enters
or perishes and the option value of waiting is set to zero. Second, firms are heterogeneous, which is key to
explaining variations in the waiting time. For example, a better-funded firm may have smaller sunk costs
of entry and be able to implement its entry plans more quickly. With these two deviations, we are able to
incorporate the timing of entry and firm heterogeneity into a dynamic oligopoly entry game.
To estimate this model, we follow the recent development in two-step estimation strategy of dynamic
oligopoly entry games. In such two-step procedure of estimation, the econometrician first obtains the con-
ditional choice probability at any given state from data and then matches the empirical conditional choice
probability with its counterpart predicted by the model. The first step is nonparametric, which puts a limit
on the number of state variables in such a model. In our setting, this means a limit on the number of
firms’ heterogeneous characteristics that we can incorporate.1 We solve this problem by mapping multiple
dimensions of firm- and firm/market-specific heterogeneity into a single dimension —- a variable which de-
scribes the type of a potential entrant in a market. To do this, we incorporate the decision of an established
firm to become a potential entrant into a local market. This decision reflects a firm’s expectation of future
payoffs against its expectation of the entry costs. The observed relationship between firm- and firm/market-
specific attributes and a firm’s decision in a market therefore gives us a projection from these attributes to
a single-dimensional characteristic of this firm. We then categorize firms into high-cost and low-cost types
based on this single dimension of firm heterogeneity. The advantage of our approach is that the type of a
firm is estimated from firms’ decisions on becoming potential entrants instead of imposed on in an ad hoc
fashion.
This is still work in progress and we have two key findings from preliminary results. First, market size,
measured by the number of business establishments, affects the operating profit of a CLEC positively once
it becomes an incumbent. Therefore the larger the market is, the more likely is a CLEC to enter. This befits
the traditional wisdom in line of Bresenhan and Reiss (1991) that a larger market size is necessary to support
1On the contrary, in the reduced-form framework incorporating firm-level heterogeneity is typically not an issue. For example,
Morton (1999) conducts regression analysis to study which attributes of potential entrants contribute to entry decision in the
pharmaceutical industry. However, a reduced-form framework cannot allow us to properly address the policy question that we
are interested in.
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more competitors. Second, firm-level heterogeneity in entry costs plays a significant role in determining what
types of CLECs enter and what types do not. We do find that two types of CLECs, one with lower entry
costs than the other, display asymmetric entry behavior. These two results are as expected. The estimate
of the competition effect, however, is significantly positive. We discuss several potential reasons behind
this anti-intuitive result and possible solutions correspondingly. For example, we think that accounting for
unobserved heterogeneity and the growing trend of this new industry will improve our estimates. The next
step for us is to modify the model and the estimation strategy and produce finalized estimation results.
With estimated structural parameters, we can conduct counterfactual simulations to understand the
effectiveness of subsidy policies with different focuses. We are also able to assess the impact of ignoring the
option value of waiting upon policy results. Due to lack of data on potential entrants, existing research in the
literature has to assume an arbitrary number of potential entrants. Moreover, these potential entrants are
assumed to be short-run players, who enter or perish in any given period. The optional value of waiting for
any potential entrant is essentially assumed to be 0. This is obviously not the case in many real world entry
settings, including the local telephone markets we study. In our data we observe the identities of all potential
entrants and the waiting time of each potential entrant before it enters. This feature provides aids for us
to show bias in our parameter estimates and policy counterfactual simulations due to these unreasonable
assumptions.
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we briefly review literature on entry game and telecommu-
nication industries. In section 3 we introduce data we use. Section 3 and 4 describe in detail our model and
estimation strategy. Section 4 reports some preliminary results.
2 Literature Review
Estimating dynamic entry games has been the research front of empirical Industrial Organization for the last
decade. The goal is to recover the distribution of sunk cost, which is usually unobserved in data but plays
a pivotal role in determining market structure and competition. The distribution of sunk cost is usually
recovered from the observed probability of entry conditioning on some market-level attributes determining
post-entry payoffs. A handful of papers (Aguirregabiria & Mira, 2007; Bajari, Benkard & Levinson, 2007;
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POB; Pesendorfer & Schmidt-Dengler, 2003) have made significant progress after Hotz & Miller (1993) by
proposing a two-step estimation strategy, in which it is unnecessary to solve for equilibrium in a complex
dynamic model. However, due to lack of data there is an important limitation to applications utilizing this
approach (Collard-Wexler, 2008; Ryan, 2009; Dunne, Klimek, Roberts, & Xu, 2009). Researchers do not
observe the number and the identities of potential entrants and therefore have to assume that potential en-
trants are homogenous and short-run players. Without considering the firm- and market- level heterogeneity
reflected in the timing of entry, we will lose critical information in the process of recovering the distribution
of entry costs. Moreover, paradoxically the players who play these dynamic games face a short-run decision
of entering or perishing.2 In fact, in most industries the decision facing a potential entrant is usually to
enter or wait. This paper is trying to make amendment in these regards and, because of this amendment,
bridge up the gap between the advancement in empirical dynamic entry game literature and the complex
real entry game in which firms are often ex-ante heterogeneous long run players.
This project is also related to the literature on examining competition in the local telephone markets.
Closest to this work are Greenstein and Mazzeo (2006), who study CLEC entry decisions into differentiated
categories using a ”static” entry model, and Goldfarb and Xiao (2010), who emphasize heterogeneity in
managerial ability in the first year of this industry. Our paper complements theirs in that all three emphasize
the importance of firm-level heterogeneity in understanding the strategic interaction of the US local telephone
market.3
3 Data
We combine information from the CLEC annual reports by the New Paradigm Resources Group, Inc.
(NPRG) and the US Census Bureau’s Zip Code Business Pattern to create a panel data set on firms’
entry decisions into cities, firm-level characteristics, and market attributes.
A) The NPRG CLEC annual reports
We acquired the 1998-2002 CLEC annual reports from NPRG, which contain information on the uni-
2Fan (2006) makes the distinction between a short-run and long-run player in a dynamic entry game.
3Other papers on the US telecommunication industry include Economides, Seim, and Viard (2008), Ackerberg et al (2009),
Mini (2001), and Alexander and Feinberg (2004).
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verse of facilities-based CLECs4 in the United States since the passage of the1996 Telecommunication Act.5
NPRG provides a detailed profile for every CLEC on its history, management, ownership and organization,
technology, state certification, and the location of its local voice and data networks. From these profiles, we
know all local voice markets that a CLEC served and the exact year of entry. We also have firm attributes
such as the year the company was founded, the zip code of the headquarter, whether the company is public
or private, whether the company is venture capital funded, and whether the company is a wholly owned
subsidiary of a larger telecommunications company.
More importantly, a neat feature of the local telephone industry enables us to identify the set of potential
entrants in each local market. CLECs must first apply for and receive certification from the state regulators
before they can operate in a given city within the state. Once approved, the CLEC can operate anywhere
within the state. Therefore, we identify potential entrants in a market as the set of CLECs with certification
to operate in the state. It is important to note that while regulatory approval is necessary for entry, it is not
sufficient. After receiving state certification, it usually takes months to years for a CLEC to commit actual
entry. Some CLECs never entered a state for which they are approved to enter during the years covered in
this study.
B) Market definition, characteristics, and selection
To complement CLECs’ voice network data, we obtain information on location characteristics in corre-
sponding years. The locations in the NPRG reports, i.e., the cities a CLEC provides services to, are best
interpreted as the Census “place”, rather than the county or metropolitan statistical area. So we choose a
Census place as our market definition and use the popular name ”city” henceforth.
As most of these CLECs’ cater to small business clientele in the early years of the competitive telecom-
munication industry, we think the best proxy of market size is the number of business establishments in a
city. We decompose a city into a set of Zip Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs) and obtain the numbers of
4Facilities-based CLECs are CLECs which build their own physical networks instead of resell the existing networks of the
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs). Facilities-based CLECs are deemed by the industry experts to represent true
competition to ILECs.
5The NPRG CLEC annual reports cover 1996 to current. However, 1998 is the year when NPRG started to report for the
universe, instead of a selected sample, of facilities-based CLECs. In 2001, NPRG split facilities-based rural CLECs into another
report series, which were only published for the year of 2001 and 2002. Therefore, we are only able to assemble information on
the universe of facilities-based CLECs from 1998 to 2002.
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business establishments from the Zip Code Business Patterns.6
Lastly, we select medium-sized cities based on the number of business establishments. We only keep cities
in which the number of business establishments in 1997 falls between 2,000 and 15,000. Basically, we drop
the top 25 large cities because CLECs may not be able to directly compete with each other in large cities7;
we drop a vast number of very small cities because in the early years of this industry the CLECs may not be
realistically considered having true intentions to enter these cities. In the end, we have 398 medium cities
remaining in our sample.
C) Summary statistics
This combination of NPRG data and city-level business pattern data has several appealing features. Not
only do we have information on all entry by all firms from the effective start of the industry, we can also
match this to rich data on firm characteristics and measures affectively profitability in each market.
Tables 1, 2, and 3 report descriptive statistics. Table 1 shows that these firms are generally privately
owned (59% to 64% across years) and have a high variance in age (the standard deviation is about twice the
mean for all years). A small proportion of these firms are subsidiaries to large corporations (26% to 32%
across years) and partially funded by venture capital (17% to 22% across years). On average, these firms
aim at regional or national scale, reflected by the large numbers of states which they have certification to
enter. The average number of states certified has increased gradually and peaked in year 2001, when the
market suffered a valuation crash. In contrast, the average number of cities a firm enters has increased more
dramatically from 4 in 1998 to 12 in 2002. Lastly, the number of firms across years reflects the rapid boom
and bust in the early years of this industry.
Table 2 describes the 398 mid-size cities that we use for our analysis. The number of business estab-
lishments is gradually increasing until year 2001, reflecting the ups and downs of the macro econmy in this
period. The number of incumbent CLECs is gradually increasing despite the 2001 crash, reflecting the fact
that this is a new and growing industry. A typical city has a large set of potential entrants but only a few
incumbents (including ILECs)8 and entrants. The number of new entrants has gone through a rapid increase
6The Business Census only provides this information at the city level every five years while the Zip Code Business Patterns do
this annually. We use a cross reference from ZCTAs to cities based on the 2000 Business Census to perform the decomposition.
7Atlanta is the cutoff city based on this threshold. We will try different cutoffs to check robustness of results in revisions.
8Each market only has one ILEC.
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and then a sharp drop, which again echoes the 2001 valuation crash.
Table 3 summarizes the data at the firm-market level to give the readers a sense of the exogenous and
endogenous variables we use in our structural model. The firm attributes we select to use are those we think
determine whether a firm is a high- or low-cost potential entrant. These attributes include the ownership,
organizational and financial structure of the firm, as well as the age of the firm at the beginning of the CLEC
industry. We also have a measure of the distance (in kilometers) between a firm’s headquarter zip code and
the centroid of a state 9, which is a significant determinant of sunk cost of entry as well. The endogenous
variable in this study is a potential entrant’ decisions on entry each year.
4 Model
The model is based on Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007) with three differences: (1) We assume that
potential entrants, i.e., firms with state certification, are long-run players. Therefore, a potential entrant
chooses to enter or to wait in each period, and accordingly the option value of waiting is positive. (2) We
allow potential entrants to be ex ante heterogenous. While POB assume that all potential entrants draw
their entry costs from the same distribution, our model allows different types of potential entrants to face
different distributions. (3) In addition to firms’ entry decisions, we also use their decisions on whether to
become potential entrants in the model. Specifically, we use them to identify a firm’s type. The key idea
is that a firm decides to apply for state certification only if its expected value of being a potential entrant
is sufficiently high. The expected value depends on the distribution of the entry costs, which is in turn
determined by the type of the firm. A firm’s decision on certification application therefore reveals its type.
4.1 Decisions on Becoming Potential Entrants
In this Section, we describe a firm’s decision on obtaining state certification, that is, a firm’s decision to
become a potential entrant, and explain how these decisions can help us infer firms’ heterogenous entry
costs. When a firm decides on whether to obtain certification in a state, it compares the expected value of
being a potential entrant in this state with the cost of obtaining certification. The expected value of being
9We use a software to calculate the distance between the zip code’s and the state’s centroid (in latitude and longitude).
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a potential entrant, in turn, is determined by the expected payoff and the expected cost of future entry
into cities located in the state. The expected payoff of entry can be captured by the state-year fixed effect,
which reflects a general expectation of aggregate operating profits for a given state in a given year. We allow
entry costs to depend on firm-specific characteristics. Specifically, firm attributes (denoted by zf ) such as
whether the firm is private owned, whether it is a subsidiary, whether it is financed by venture capital and
the age of the firm in 1998 10 contribute to the determination of entry costs. We also consider the distance
between the headquarter of the firm and the centroid of a state (denoted by dfs) to capture the idea that
firms face higher entry costs in more distant geography. As the firm is trading off the expected value and
cost of becoming a potential entrant, the mapping between these characteristics and a firm’s decisions on
obtaining state certification provides information on the unobserved association of these characteristics and
a firm’s entry costs. To this end, we specify a Logit model:
Pr (certificationfst|zf , dfs) = exp (ξst + ϕ1zf + ϕ2dfs)
1 + exp (ξst + ϕ1zf + ϕ2dfs)
, (1)
where ξst is the state/year fixed effect capturing the payoff of future entry into cities located in the state.
With estimated ϕˆ, we project multiple dimensions of firm-level heterogeneity into a single dimension, which
we will use in the next stage as a proxy for firms’ ex-ante heterogeneity affecting entry costs. In short,
ϕˆ1zf + ϕˆ2dfs represents a firm f ’s “type” in state s.
4.2 Decisions on Entry into Local Markets
After obtaining state certification, a firm decides whether to enter a city inside the state in each period.
At the beginning of each period, a potential entrant observes its entry cost. The entry costs, distributed
independently across firms, is a firm’s private information. This distribution of the entry costs depends
on the type of a firm, which has been described in the previous section. To restrict the dimensions of the
state space, we discretize the type ϕˆ1zf + ϕˆ2dfs into two categories: type 1 and type 2. Given that firm
attributes are publicly observed by all firms, the number of potential entrants of each type in a city is
common knowledge.
A potential entrant then compares its entry costs with its expected present value of the profit stream
101998 is the first year of our data, when NPGR starts to collection information on the universe of CLECs.
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it will receive upon entry. The profit of a firm operating in a city, which is assumed to be identical for all
firms, depends on the size of the market and the number of incumbents. Let mct be the market size and
nct the number of incumbents in city c in year t. The market size mct evolves exogenously according to a
first-order Markov chain process, whereas the number of incumbents nct evolves endogenously. We assume
that the one-period profit function is of the following parametric form:
pi (nct,mct) = m
α
ct/ (1 + nct)
γ
, (2)
where α (the market size effect) and γ (the competition effect) are parameters to be estimated.
We now describe the dynamic game of entry. At the beginning of each period, a potential entrant
observes its own cost of entry and knows the types of other potential entrants. If a potential entrant decides
to enter the market, it will start to earn profits next period after paying an up-front cost of entry this period.
Therefore, the value of entry is the expected value of being an incumbent next period. An incumbent in such
a dynamic game typically also decides whether to continue operating at the end of each period. We choose
not to endogenize this decision for the following two reasons. First, in our data an incumbent always stays
in the local market until the firm exits as a whole, which is consistent with the observation that the variable
cost of maintaining operation is very low. Second, during the time span covered in study the large-scale
exiting (often referred to as telecom “meltdown”) is largely due to “exogenous” shocks related to macro
economy and FCC re-regulation. Therefore, we assume that a firm exits exogenously with probability pxt
in year t. All firms face the same probability of exit. However, in line with the data this probability varies
across years. We assume that pxt is centered at px, which is common knowledge among all firms and will be
estimated from the data.
As specified above, the distribution of a firm’s entry costs depends on the type of the firm and the
profit depends on (mct, nct). Therefore, the number of potential entrants of each type (T1ct, T2ct) as well as
(mct, nct) are relevant state variables for firms’ decisions. For notation simplicity, we suppress subscripts c, t
hereafter in this section. From now on, we use the phrase “geographic state” for an actual state, such as
California, and the word “state” for a state in this dynamic model.
A potential entrant’s decision is based on the comparison of the value of entry net of entry costs with the
value of waiting. As explained, the value of entry is the expected value of being an incumbent next period.
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The value of waiting is the expected value of being a potential entrant next period. Let V I (m,n, T1, T2)
be the value of an incumbent at state (m,n, T1, T2) and V
E (m,n, T1, T2, τ , ζ) that of a potential entrant of
type τ with entry costs ζ. Therefore,
V E (m,n, T1, T2, τ , ζ) = max
{
−ζ + β(1− px)Ee(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2,τ)V
I (m′, n′, T ′1, T
′
2) , (3)
β(1− px)Ew(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2)Eζ′|τV
E
(
m′, n′, T ′1, T
′
2, τ , ζ
′)} ,
where Ee
(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2,τ)
is the potential entrant’s expectation conditional on itself entering at state
(m,n, T1, T2) when its own type is τ , E
w
(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2,τ)
is that conditional on itself waiting and Eζ′|τ
denotes the expectation of its entry cost of next period. Note the difference of the value functions and the
expectation operators in the first term and the second term in (3). For a long-run player, the value of waiting
is the expected value of being a potential entrant next period. Consequently, the expectation is taken over
the distribution of next period’s entry costs ζ ′ conditional on its own type τ and over the state next period
(m′, n′, T ′1, T
′
2) conditional on itself waiting. In (3), β is the discount factor and px is the expected probability
that a firm will exit. For notation simplicity, we define δ = β(1− px) as the discount factor adjusted by the
probability of exit. Similarly, the value of incumbent in (3) is
V I (m,n, T1, T2) = pi (m,n) + δE(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2)V
I (m′, n′, T ′1, T
′
2) . (4)
Following Hotz and Miller (1993) and using the assumption that entry costs and sell-off value are i.i.d.,
we define the value of entry for potential entrants at state (m,n, T1, T2) before they observe their entry costs
as
V E (m,n, T1, T2, τ) = E
e
(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2)
V I (m′, n′, T ′1, T
′
2) ; (5)
and the value of waiting as
VW (m,n, T1, T2, τ) = E
w
(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2)
Eζ′|τV E
(
m′, n′, T ′1, T
′
2, τ , ζ
′) . (6)
Note that the value of waiting depends on a firm’s own type τ because it determines the distribution of the
firm’s entry costs next period.
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Plugging (3) into (6) gives the value of waiting:
VW (m,n, T1, T2, τ) (7)
= Ew(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2)
Eζ′|τ max
{
δV W
(
m′, n′, T
′
1, T
′
2, τ
)
, δV E
(
m′, n′, T
′
1, T
′
2, τ
)
− ζ ′
}
= Ew(m′,n′,T ′1,T ′2)|(m,n,T1,T2)
{
(1− pe (m′, n′, T ′1, T ′2, τ)) δV W
(
m′, n′, T
′
1, T
′
2, τ
)
+
pe (m′, n′, T ′1, T
′
2, τ)
(
δV E (m′, n′, T ′1, T
′
2, τ)− E
[
ζ|ζ < δV E (m′, n′, T ′1, T ′2, τ)− δV W
(
m′, n′, T
′
1, T
′
2, τ
)])}
,
where pe (m′, n′, T ′1, T
′
2, τ) is the probability of entry at state (m
′, n′, T ′1, T
′
2) for a firm of type τ .
We close the model by specifying the density of the entry cost (ζ). Following POB, we assume that the
density for firms of type 1 or 2 is
fj (ζ) = µ
2
j
(
ζ − 1
µj
)
exp
(
−µj
(
ζ − 1
µj
))
,
where µj , j = 1, 2 are parameters to be estimated.
5 Estimation
Estimation is carried out in two main steps. In the first step, we “determine” the type of each firm. To this
end, we estimate (ϕ1, ϕ2) in (1). We then compute ϕˆ1zf + ϕˆ2dfs for each firm and divide the value into two
groups: a firm f is of type 1 in geographic state s if and only if ϕˆ1zf + ϕˆ2dfs is below the mean; otherwise,
this firm is of type 2 in geographic state s.
In the second step, we estimate the parameters in the profit function (α, γ), the parameters in the
entry costs functions (µ1, µ2) and the discount factor adjusted by exiting probability δ = β (1− px). We
first estimate px directly from data
11 and we choose β according to the real interest rate. The rest of the
parameters are estimated following the procedure in POB with only one modification: we need to consistently
estimate the value of waiting as well as the value of entry.
To estimate these values, we rewrite equations (3), (5) and (7) in vector forms. The state in this study is
a quadruple (m,n, T1, T2). Suppose there are J distinct states. We denote the ith state by (mi, ni, T1i, T2i).
With slight abuse of the notation, let V I (α, γ, δ) be the vector with V I (mi, ni, T1i, T2i) as its ith element.
11The average exit probability at the firm level is about 23.9% from 1999 to 2002.
12
Here we add parameters as inputs of V I (α, γ, δ) explicitly. Similarly, the ith element of the vector pi (α, γ)
is pi (mi, ni). With these notations, we can rewrite equation (3) in vector forms as
V I (α, γ, δ) = pi (α, γ) + δMV I (α, γ, δ) , (8)
where M is the transition probability matrix, i.e., its ij-element is the transition probability from state
(mi, ni, T1i, T2i) to (mj , nj , T1j , T2j). This matrix M will be estimated directly from data.
Similarly, we define the vectors of the entry value of both types as V E1 (α, γ, δ) and V E2 (α, γ, δ). Their
ith elements are V E (mi, ni, T1i, T2i, τ = 1) and V E (mi, ni, T1i, T2i, τ = 2), respectively. Analogously, we
define the vectors VW1 (α, γ, δ) and VW2 (α, γ, δ) as the value of waiting for type-1 and type-2 firms. Then,
equations (5) and (7) for τ = 1, 2 can be rewritten as
V Eτ (α, γ, δ) = M
e
τV
I (α, γ, δ) , (9)
and
VWτ
(
α, γ, µ
τ
, δ
)
= Mwτ
{
(1− pe) δV Wτ
(
α, γ, µ
τ
, δ
)
(10)
+pe
(
δV Eτ (α, γ, δ)− E
[
ζ|ζ < δV Eτ (α, γ, δ)− δV Wτ
(
α, γ, µ
τ
, δ
)
;µ
τ
])}
,
whereMeτ is a matrix whose ij-element is the transition probability from state (mi, ni, T1i, T2i) to (mj , nj , T1j , T2j)
conditional on a type-τ potential entrant entering and Mwτ is the same matrix conditional on waiting.
To estimate V Eτ (α, γ, δ) and VWτ
(
α, γ, µ
τ
, δ
)
, we need consistent estimates of the transition probability
matrices M , Meτ and M
w
τ . We use their empirical counterparts following POB. See Appendix A for the details
on Mˆ, Mˆe1 , Mˆ
e
2 , Mˆ
w
1 ,and Mˆ
w
2 .
With Mˆ, Mˆe1 , Mˆ
e
2 , Mˆ
w
1 ,and Mˆ
w
2 estimated, the estimate of the value of entry is given by
V Eˆτ (α, γ, δ) = Mˆ
e
τ Vˆ
I
τ (α, γ, δ) (11)
where
Vˆ Iτ (α, γ, δ) =
(
I − δMˆ
)−1
pi (α, γ) ,
and I is an identity matrix. Similarly, V Wˆτ (α, γ, µτ , δ) is the fixed point of (10) when V Eτ (α, γ, δ), M
w
τ and
pe are replaced by their empirical counterparts. Note that the RHS of equation (10) is a contraction mapping
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of VWτ
(
α, γ, µj , δ
)
because ζ is assumed to be a log concave random variable (with gamma distribution)
and therefore, 0 ≤ ∂E(ζ|ζ<d)∂d ≤ 1 (see Proposition 1 of Heckman and Honore (2003)).
Once we have consistent estimates of the values of entry and waiting, we can get consistent estimates
of the probabilities of entry for given parameters. The probability of entry at state (mi, ni, T1i, T2i) is the
probability that the entry costs are smaller than the difference between the value of entry and the value of
waiting at this state. In other words, the vector of probabilities of entry for a type-τ firm is
pˆe
τ
(
α, γ, µ
τ
, δ
)
= Γ
(
2, λδ
[
V Eˆτ (α, γ, δ)− V Wˆτ (α, γ, µτ , δ)
])
where Γ (a, x) =
∫ x
0
ta−1e−tdt is the incomplete gamma function.
We estimate four parameters: distribution parameters
(
µ
1
, µ2
)
and model parameters (α, γ). These
parameters are estimated with the Generalized Methods of Moments. Five moment conditions are used.
These conditions posit that prediction errors are uncorrelated the explanatory variables. Specifically, the
prediction errors of entry at state (mi, ni, T1i, T2i) for type-1 firms and type-2 firms are respectively
ε1 (mi, ni, T1i, T2i) = pˆ
e
1i
(
α, γ, µ
τ
, δ
)
T1i − 1
#K (mi, ni, T1i, T2i)
(∑
k∈K(mi,ni,T1i,T2i)
e1(k)
)
ε2 (mi, ni, T1i, T2i) = pˆ
e
2i
(
α, γ, µ
τ
, δ
)
T2i − 1
#K (mi, ni, T1i, T2i)
(∑
k∈K(mi,ni,T1i,T2i)
e2(k)
)
,
whereK (mi, ni, T1i, T2i) is the collection of all market/years whose states are (mi, ni, T1i, T2i) and #K (mi, ni, T1i, T2i)
is the cardinality of the set K. Since the predication errors depend on the state interacting with the type
of a firm, we define a quintuple (mh, nh, T1h, T2h, τh). Given that there are J distinct states defined by
(m,n, T1, T2), there exist 2J such quintuples. The moment conditions are
1
2J
2J∑
i=1
ετ (mi, ni, T1i, T2i, τ i) · xi = 0 for xi = 1, mi, ni, T1i, T2i, τ i − 1. (12)
These conditions hold because the market size, the number of incumbents, the number of potential entrants
of either type and the type of a firm are all assumed exogenous. Note that the value of the type τ is either
1 or 2. We use τ − 1 to define a dummy according to the firm type.
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6 Preliminary Results
We have obtained some preliminary results using the model and estimation strategy described above. In
the follows we discuss these results and their potential problems. Note that we drop year 1998 from our
data and only use year 1999 to 2002 for our structural estimation. This is because we do not observe the
number of CLEC incumbents in 1998, the first year we have data. Consequently, if we were to include 1998,
we would have to assume that all firms in 1998 were new entrants. This might lead to an underestimate of
incumbents and an overestimate of new entrants because CLECs have started to enter right after the 1996
Telecom Act.
A) State Certification regression results
Table 4 shows results from the reduced-form regression of established CLECs’ decisions to obtain state
certification for the first time. The first two columns are OLS and Logit regressions and the last two are
their counterparts with state-year fixed effects included. Here we use state-year fixed effects to capture a
general expectation of aggregate operating profits for a given state in a given year. The results in the last
two columns clearly indicate that observed firm attributes are key determinants of firms’ decisions to obtain
state certification. CLECs that are privately owned or subsidiaries to larger firms are significantly less likely
to obtain state certification. However, those funded by venture capital or having a longer operating history
show the opposite pattern. Furthermore, CLECs are significantly less likely to obtain state certification
in states farther from their headquarters, suggesting that CLECs may have higher entry costs into a more
distant geography.
As described in the section on firms’ decisions to become potential entrants, we use results from certi-
fication regression (Column 4, Table 4)to obtain ϕˆ1zf + ϕˆ2dfs, which determines a firmf ’s “type” in state
s. We then divide firms into two categories according to this measure: type 1 and type 2 —- CLECs with
ϕˆ1zf + ϕˆ2dfs smaller than the mean are labeled as type 1 and those with this measure larger than the mean
are considered type 2.12 As explained in the model, any market-year combination can now be characterized
by four state variables: market size (log of the number of business establishments), number of incumbents
(including both ILECs and CLECs), number of type-1 potential entrants, and number of type-2 potential
12Note when we calculate the mean we disregard 1998 data as we do not use 1998 in estimation.
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entrants. A potential entrant’s decision on entry also depends on its own type. Table 5 summarizes these 5
state variables, which are used to explain entry behavior of CLECs from 1999 to 2002.
B) Estimates of structural parameters
Table 6 report preliminary results on the 4 structural parameters in the model. The left panel reports
results with equal weight on all states (i.e. the aforementioned four-dimensional state of a year-market). The
right panel reports results with different weights on states, where the weight is the number of year-markets
with each state. That is, in the right panel we put more weight on states with more year-market observations.
We can see that estimates in the two panels are very close, however, 3 out of 4 parameters are estimated
without much precision with equal weight. Moving from the left panel to right we gain much significance in
our estimates, suggesting that the number of year-market observations in a state adds relevant information
to the estimation. We thus choose the results with weighted states as our baseline results.
From the right panel results, two of them are as expected. First, market size, measured by the number
of business establishments, affects the operating profit of a CLEC positively once it becomes an incumbent.
Therefore the larger the market is, the more likely is a CLEC to enter. This befits the traditional wisdom in
line of Bresenhan and Reiss (1991) that a larger market size is necessary to support more competitors. This
also implies that smaller markets may be kept from having a competitive structure, as these markets do not
have sufficient demand to attract competitive entry. Second, firm-level heterogeneity in entry costs plays a
significant role in determining a firm’s entry into a local market. We find that potential entrants labeled
as “type 1” have higher entry costs that the “type 2” potential entrants,13 and are therefore more likely to
enter ceteris paribus. Both types’ entry cost parameter is estimated with statistical significance.
The competition effect, however, is not easy to be rationalized. We expected γ to be positive to capture
the negative competition effect, which suggests more incumbents in a market will erode average profitability.
This is the result from traditional wisdom and a vast number of studies on market structure and competition.
There are a few possible reasons for this anti-intuitive result. First, there may exist market-level unob-
served heterogeneity which is not captured by our single variable measuring market demand —- the size of
the market. For example, the income and education level of the local population may be strong factors in
13The mean of entry cost is
2
uj
.
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attracting CLEC entry. If this unobserved market-level heterogeneity is persistent over time, it is positively
correlated with the number of incumbents, which may lead to an upward bias in the effect of latter on
profitability. We have tried dropping the number of incumbents from instruments in our GMM estimation;
but results stay similar and we suspect this is because the number of potential entrants suffers the same
endogeneity problem. To deal with this problem, we can either incorporate more market characteristics
into our model and estimation or allow an unobserved state affecting firms’ decision. The latter solution
is computationally intensive. Regarding the former solution, we are currently investigating relevant market
attributes. Second, the model we have set up has the exogenous variables following a stationary process
while the real market may be a non-stationary process. As the competitive local telephone market is new
and growing rapidly in the first decade after the 1996 Telecom Act, a non-stationary entry model may fit
the data better. We can potentially set up a model that incorporates the growing feature at the beginning
of this industry. The estimation strategy described above can still be used as long as we add the restriction
that the process is stationary from certain year on. Both reasons call for a major revision of the model and
we are still trying to figure out the best way to proceed. Adding persistent unobserved heterogeneity or
adding a non-stationary process are both challenging and in the very front of research on empirical dynamic
models.
References
[1] Ackerberg, D. A., M. H. Riordan, G. L. Rosston, and B. S. Wimmer (2009), ”Low-Income Demand for
Local Telephone Service: Effects of Lifeline and Linkup”. Working paper, UCLA.
[2] Aguirregabiria, V. and P. Mira (2007), “Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games,” Econo-
metrica, 75, 1-53.
[3] Alexander, D. L., and R. M. Feinberg (2004), “Entry in Local Telecommunications Markets,” Review
of Industrial Organization, 25, 107-127.
[4] Bajari, P., L. Benkard and J. Levinson (2007), “Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition,”
Econometrica, 75, 1331-1370.
17
[5] Bresnahan, T. F. and P. C. Reiss. 1991. “Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets,”Journal of
Political Economy, 99(5): 977-1009.
[6] Collard-Wexler, A. (2008), “Demand Fluctuations and Plant Turnover in the Ready-Mix Concrete
Industry,” working paper, New York University.
[7] Dunne T., S. Klimek, M. Roberts, and D. Y. Xu (2009), “Entry, Exit and the Determinants of Market
Structure,” working paper, Pennsylvania State University.
[8] Economides, N., K. Seim, and V. B. Viard (2008), “Quantifying the Benefits of Entry into Local
Telephone Service,” RAND Journal of Economics, 39, 699-730.
[9] Fan, Y. (2006), “Estimating the Costs of Market Entry and Exit for Video Rental Stores,” working
paper, University of Michgan.
[10] Goldfarb, A. and M. Xiao (2010), ”Who thinks about the competition? Managerial ability and strategic
entry in US local telephone markets,” Working paper, Univeristy of Toronto.
[11] Greenstein, S. and M.J. Mazzeo (2006), “The Role of Differentiation Strategy in Local Telecommunica-
tion Entry and Market Evolution: 1999-2002,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 54 (3), 323-350.
[12] Hotz, V. J., and R. A. Miller (1993), “Conditional Choice Probabilities and the Estimation of Dynamic
Models,” The Review of Economic Studies, 60(3), 497–529.
[13] Mini, F. (2001), “The Role of Incentives for Opening Monopoly Markets: Comparing GTE and BOC
Cooperation with Local Entrants,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 49(3), 379-414.
[14] Scott Morton, Fiona M. (1999), “Entry decisions in the generic pharmaceutical industry,” The RAND
Journal of Economics, 30(3), 421-440.
[15] Pakes, Ariel, Michael Ostrovsky, and Steven Berry (2007), “Simple Estimators for the Parameters of
Discrete Dynamic Games, with Entry/Exit Examples,” RAND Journal of Economics, v. 38(2), pp.373-
399
18
[16] Pesendorfer, M., and P. Schmidt-Dengler (2003): “Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Games,”
NBER Working Paper 9726,.
[17] Ryan, S. (2009), “The Costs of Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated Industry,” working paper,
MIT.
19
A Appendix: Estimation of the Transition Probability
The estimate of the unconditional transition probability is
Mˆij =
∑
k∈K(mi,ni,T1i,T2i) 1
{(
n(k+1),m(k+1), T1(k+1), T2(k+1)
)
= (mj , nj , T1j , T2j)
}
#K (mi, ni, T1i, T2i)
, (13)
where K (mi, ni, T1i, T2i) is the collection of all market/years whose states are (mi, ni, T1i, T2i), k represent
such a market/year and k + 1 represent the same market one year later. The cardinality of the set K is
#K (mi, ni, T1i, T2i).
The estimate of the transition probability conditional on a type-1 firm entering is
Mˆe1ij =
∑
k∈K(mi,ni,T1i,T2i) e1(k)1
{(
n(k+1),m(k+1), T1(k+1), T2(k+1)
)
= (mj , nj , T1j , T2j)
}∑
k∈K(mi,ni,T1i,T2i) e1(k)
, (14)
where e1(k) is the number of type-1 entrants in market/year k. Note that the transition of the states
is weighted by the ratio of the probability that (e1 − 1) out of T1 potential entrants do enter over the
probability that e1 out of T1 potential entrants enter. Similarly,
Mˆe2ij =
∑
k∈K(mi,ni,T1i,T2i) e2(k)1
{(
n(k+1),m(k+1), T1(k+1), T2(k+1)
)
= (mj , nj , T1j , T2j)
}∑
k∈K(mi,ni,T1i,T2i) e2(k)
. (15)
The same argument gives the estimate of the transition probability conditional on waiting. The transition
of the states conditional on waiting for type-1 firms is weighted by the ratio of the probability that e1 out
of T1 potential entrants enter over the probability that e1 out of T1 potential entrants enter. The transition
for type-2 firms is analogously weighted. In other words, the estimates are
Mˆw1ij =
∑
k∈K(mi,ni,T1i,T2i) 1
{(
n(k+1),m(k+1), T1(k+1), T2(k+1)
)
= (mj , nj , T1j , T2j)
}∑
k∈K(mi,ni,T1i,T2i)
(
T1i − e1(k)
) , (16)
and
Mˆw2ij =
∑
k∈K(mi,ni,T1i,T2i) 1
{(
n(k+1),m(k+1), T1(k+1), T2(k+1)
)
= (mj , nj , T1j , T2j)
}∑
k∈K(mi,ni,T1i,T2i)
(
T2i − e2(k)
) . (17)
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Firm-Year
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Variables Mean(std. dev.)
Privately owned 0.639 0.595 0.581 0.598 0.640
(0.483) (0.493) (0.495) (0.493) (0.483)
Subsidiary 0.320 0.284 0.282 0.268 0.302
(0.469) (0.453) (0.452) (0.445) (0.462)
Financed by venture capital 0.176 0.190 0.222 0.206 0.221
(0.383) (0.394) (0.418) (0.407) (0.417)
Firm age 8.897 8.526 11.020 13.330 15.267
(20.207) (16.548) (20.769) (23.416) (24.695)
# states certified 9.021 10.810 12.872 13.134 12.814
(10.941) (11.859) (12.103) (12.271) (12.326)
# cities to enter 100.381 111.138 127.111 122.196 123.209
(108.026) (112.298) (116.250) (114.220) (117.659)
# cities entered 3.938 8.034 10.923 11.330 11.837
(8.092) (14.935) (16.345) (14.243) (15.860)
# observations (firm) 97 116 117 97 86
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by Market-Year
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Variables Mean(std. dev.)
# business establishments 3999.083 4022.314 4020.987 4010.884 4091.384
(2435.669) (2438.102) (2437.705) (2426.277) (2468.029)
# incumbents n.a. 0.819 1.598 1.960 2.224
(1.429) (2.185) (2.603) (2.776)
# potential entrants 24.465 31.573 35.769 27.822 24.400
(7.481) (9.616) (10.493) (10.000) (8.577)
# entrants 0.960 1.523 1.613 0.802 0.334
(1.618) (1.798) (2.268) (1.150) (0.599)
# observations (city as market) 98
Table 3: Summary Statistics by Firm-Market
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Firm attributes
Privately owned 0.417 0.493 0 1
Subsidiary 0.184 0.387 0 1
Funded by venture capital 0.197 0.398 0 1
Firm age in 1998 10.443 22.000 0 114
Firm-market attribute
Distance from firm headquarter to market (in 1000 kms) 1.470 1.107 0.0002 4.390
Market-level state variables
# business establishments (in 1000s) 3.998 2.383 1.648 14.136
# incumbents 1.4 2.305 0 17
# potential entrants 32.217 10.171 5 55
Firm-market endogenous decision
Enter 0.035 0.183 0 1
# observations (firm-market) 59950
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Table 4: Firms’ Decisions to Obtain State Certification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Logit OLS Logit
dummy: =1 if the CLEC is privately owned -0.123 -1.326 -0.117 -1.365
(0.005)*** (0.056)*** (0.005)*** (0.059)***
dummy: =1 if the CLEC is a subsidiary of a firm -0.085 -1.077 -0.084 -1.128
(0.005)*** (0.060)*** (0.004)*** (0.063)***
dummy: =1 if the CLEC is funded by venture capital -0.005 0.195 0.011 0.302
-0.006 (0.068)*** (0.005)** (0.071)***
log of firm age in 1998 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.080
(0.003) (0.026) (0.002)*** (0.027)***
distance b/w headquarter zip code and state -0.052 -0.696 -0.066 -0.884
(0.002)*** (0.030)*** (0.002)*** (0.036)***
Constant 0.303 -1.105 0.312
(0.007)*** (0.080) (0.008)***
State-year fixed effects included? No No Yes Yes
Number of state-year fixed effects 235 227
R-squared 0.07 0.08
Log Likelihood -6050.482 -4972.045
Observations 20531 20531 20531 19933
Standard errors in parentheses* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5: Description of Variables Used in Structural Estimation
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
State variables
log(# business establishments) 8.145 0.458 7.407 9.554
# incumbents 2.485 2.217 1 18
# type 1 potential entrants 15.210 8.463 0 31
# type 2 potential entrants 17.419 7.664 0 36
Potential entrant’s type 1.541 0.498 1 2
Firm-market endogenous decision
Enter 0.036 0.186 0 1
# observations (firm-market) 47586
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Table 6: Preliminary Results
Equal Weights on States Weighted States
Structural parameter Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error
α (market size effect) 0.303 0.533 0.871 0.360**
γ (competition effect) -1.321 0.607** -0.801 0.290***
µ1 (entry cost parameter for type 1) 0.035 0.040 0.024 0.013*
µ2 (entry cost parameter for type 2) 0.037 0.042 0.026 0.014*
# observations (firm-market) 47586
Standard errors in parentheses* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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